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Many governments promote small businesses for the dual reasons of fostering ‘break-
through’ innovations and employment growth. In this paper we study the eﬀects of tax
and subsidy policies on entrepreneurs’ choice of riskiness of an innovation project and
on their mode of commercializing the innovation (market entry versus sale). Limited
loss oﬀset provisions in the tax system induce entrepreneurs to choose projects with too
little risk and this problem arises primarily when entrepreneurs market their product
themselves. When innovations reduce only the ﬁxed costs of production this leads to a
fundamental policy trade-oﬀ between the declared goals of promoting employment and
innovation in small, entrepreneurial ﬁrms. When innovations reduce variable produc-
tion costs, policies to promote small businesses may even be unambiguously harmful.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H25, L13, M13, O3
 Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Corporate taxes, Firm growth
 1 Introduction
Small, entrepreneurial businesses are widely believed to bring major innovations as
well as employment growth to society. This paper study how the tax and subsidy sys-
tem aﬀects these roles played by small businesses. Indeed, in the last few decades,
entrepreneurship has emerged as a key issue in the policy arena.1 In the European
Union, for instance, the European Commission (2008) launched the “Small Business
Act for Europe” in June 2008, which explicitly recognizes the central role of small
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in the EU economy and sets out a comprehen-
sive policy framework for the EU and its member states. Among other measures, the
Commission proposes that member states should create an environment that rewards
entrepreneurship, speciﬁcally mentioning taxation in this context.
One of the main reasons for the support of entrepreneurship is the important role they
play as providers of “breakthrough” inventions. Baumol (2002), for example, documents
the importance of the diﬀerent roles played by small entrepreneurial ﬁrms and large
established ﬁrms in the innovation process in the United States, where small entrepre-
neurial ﬁrms create a large share of breakthrough inventions whereas large, established
ﬁrms provide more routinized research and development (R&D).2 T h ei m p o r t a n c eo f
the level of riskiness in ﬁrms’ R&D strategies and its relation to ﬁrm type is illustrated
in a recent study by Henkel et al. (2010). They undertake a qualitative empirical study
of the electronic design automation (EDA) industry, which is characterized by three
large incumbents and numerous start-ups. The authors conclude that “.. as a stylized
fact, entrants pursue more radical innovation projects than incumbents. That is, they
pursue innovation projects that are both more likely to fail and, in case of success, be
more valuable than those pursued by incumbents" (p. 21).
A further argument for the promotion of SMEs is their potential to create new jobs.
It is an explicit goal of EU policy, for example, that innovative SMEs grow into large,
1The Economist (14th March 2009) recently published a special report on entrepreneurship, “Global
Heroes”, describing this phenomenon.
2Scherer and Ross (1990) list a large number of inventions made by independent innovators and
state that “new entrants without a commitment to accepted technologies have been responsible for
a substantial share of the really revolutionary new industrial products and processes”(p. 653). The
authors refer to a large number of studies indicating the importance of entrepreneurs as providers of
breakthrough inventions.
1globally successful companies (see European Commission, 2011, p. 16). A substantial
part of the net employment growth in the SME sector comes from a small number of
high-growth ﬁrms, so-called ‘Gazelles’, which are typically young and are represented
in all industries (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010).
At the same time, a substantial share of inventions made by independent innovators
is commercialized through the sale or the licensing of a patent to incumbent ﬁrms.
Serrano (2010, Table 1) reports for the United States that entrepreneurs sold 17.5% of
their patents during the period 1983-2001, and this share increases to 24% if the patents
are quality-weighted with the number of citations received. Furthermore, a large-scale
survey carried out in six EU countries suggests that an additional 10% of all patents are
l i c e n s e d( G i u r ie ta l . ,2 0 0 7 ) .B yar e l a t e dm e a s u r e ,B l o n i g e na n dT a y l o r( 2 0 0 0 ,T a b l e1 )
report that high-technology industries such as electronic and medical equipment have
been responsible for a disproportionately large share of ﬁrm acquisitions in the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
These observations suggest that it is important for a study of government policy to-
wards small, innovative businesses to endogenize two principal choices made by an
independent entrepreneur: () the level of riskiness (level of breakthrough) of a given
R&D project and () the mode of commercializing the entrepreneurial innovation. The
present study incorporates both of these choices.
Moreover, our analysis focuses on two important features of existing government tax
and subsidization policies towards small businesses.
First, tax systems in all OECD countries incorporate a fundamental asymmetry as
positive earnings are taxed immediately, whereas losses can only be oﬀset against pos-
itive incomes.3 Small entrepreneurs, who are developing a single business idea, will
therefore not be able claim a tax rebate when they invest in a project that turns out
to be unsuccessful. In Germany, for example, restrictive loss oﬀset provisions for entre-
preneurs are regarded as one of the main obstacles for the development and growth of
small, innovative businesses (EFI, 2011, p. 19). In contrast, restrictions on loss oﬀset
opportunities are less important when the project is sold to a large, incumbent ﬁrm,
3This is still true when the government tries to foster innovation by means of R&D tax credits. In
this case, companies can immediately deduct all R&D expenditures (and sometimes even more than
100% of actual expenditures), but only when there are other sources of positive income. Bloom et al.
(2002) and Ernst and Spengel (2011) empirically analyze the eﬀects of R&D tax credits on the volume
of R&D, but do not address the choice of quality (or riskiness) of an innovation project.
2as the incumbent is more diversiﬁed and will likely be able to oﬀset losses on a new
investment against positive taxable proﬁts earned in its other operations.4
Second, the existing tax and subsidy policies imply that an entrepreneur will typically
face lower taxes, net of subsidies received, if she enters the product market herself, as
compared to selling her innovation to an incumbent ﬁrm. One reason is that govern-
ments provide various support schemes for start-ups and small businesses that cover all
stages of the ﬁrms’ development and range from initial research grants to the provision
of subsidized loans and state guarantees to spur ﬁrm growth. Typically, entrepreneurs
can only take advantage of the entire range of support programs when they enter the
market themselves. In the United States, for example, two of the main programmes
to promote small businesses are the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) pro-
gramme, which grants awards for the development of technological prototypes up to
USD 850.000 per ﬁrm, and the Technological Innovation Programme (TIP), which
subsidizes the commercialization of successful prototypes with up to USD 3 million
for a single company project. However, the latter support scheme is available only if
the SME markets the product itself, or is the leading company in a joint venture (see
OECD 2010a, p. 106).5
Moreover, many start ups choose incorporation and are thus subject to corporate in-
come taxation, whereas entrepreneurs selling out to incumbent ﬁrms are typically liable
to personal income taxation on the capital gains earned. At least in Europe, corporate
tax rates have fallen signiﬁcantly below personal income taxes during the last decades,
further increasing the attractiveness of market entry from a tax perspective. In ad-
dition, several countries support small, incorporated businesses by means of reduced
corporate tax rates (see OECD, 2010b), as well as other tax breaks.6 Taken together
these provisions lead to a tax and subsidy advantage for entrepreneurs who market
their inventions themselves, rather than selling out to an incumbent ﬁrm.
4Mirrlees et al. (2011, p. 454) stress the argument that loss oﬀset limitations are more important
for small businesses than for larger ﬁrms. Cullen and Gordon (2007) provide empirical evidence that
asymmetries in the tax treatment of proﬁts and losses have large eﬀects on entrepreneurial risk-taking.
5Similar programmes exist in other countries. See OECD (2010a) which lists the most important
support schemes for SMEs in each OECD member state.
6See, for example, the chapter on small business taxation in the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees at al.,
2011). The report describes in detail the tax privileges enjoyed by small, incorporated business in the
United Kingdom.
3In this paper we study how these features of existing tax and subsidy policies inﬂuence
the interdependent decisions of the entrepreneur to select an R&D project and to choose
the mode of commercializing the innovation. Our analysis is based on the following
four-stage model. In the ﬁrst stage, the entrepreneur makes an investment and chooses
among projects with diﬀerent risk and return characteristics associated with developing
the invention. In the second stage, before the success of the project is revealed, the
investor decides to either sell her invention to one of the incumbent ﬁrms in the market,
or to enter the market herself. Under entry the entrepreneur will beneﬁtf r o ml o w e r
taxes and additional government support, if the project is successful. If the project
fails, however, the entrepreneur will not be able to claim a loss oﬀset under market
entry, whereas selling the project to an incumbent ﬁrm ensures that investment costs
are always tax-deductible. In a setting with competitive bidding by incumbents this
tax advantage will be reﬂected in a higher sales price oﬀered to the entrepreneur. In the
third stage, the uncertainty is lifted. If the investor has decided not to sell her patent,
and if the invention is successful, she will enter the market. In the ﬁn a ls t a g e ,t h e r ei s
competition between all active ﬁrms in the market, with or without the entrepreneur
and with one ﬁrm possibly having access to a superior technology.
The results of our analysis show that tax concessions and subsidies conﬁned to small
businesses make market entry by the entrepreneur more likely in equilibrium, but
at the same induce the entrepreneur to choose an ineﬃciently low-risk project, in
order to minimize the risk of being left with non-deductible investment outlays. In
our benchmark model, where innovations reduce only the ﬁxed costs of production,
this leads to a fundamental trade-oﬀ between the goals of promoting employment and
competition in technology-intensive markets, and the desire of governments to foster
risky ‘breakthrough’ inventions. In a model extension where innovations reduce variable
production costs, it is even possible that policies to promote small businesses will be
directly counterproductive by reducing both t h ed e g r e eo fi n n o v a t i o na n dt h el e v e lo f
production and employment in the innovative sector.
Our model brings together two diﬀerent strands in the literature. Firstly, there is a rela-
tively small yet established public ﬁnance literature that analyzes the eﬀects of taxes on
various decision margins of entrepreneurs.7 Several contributions focus on the progres-
siveness of the personal income tax schedule as an obstacle to entrepreneurial activity
7See Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) for a recent survey.
4(e.g. Gentry and Hubbard, 2000; Asoni and Sanandaji, 2009). In contrast, Gordon
(1998) stresses that start-up enterprises have the option of incorporating, thus bene-
ﬁting from the widespread fall in corporate tax rates over the last few decades. Cullen
and Gordon (2007) empirically estimate the eﬀects of imperfect loss oﬀset provisions
and of rate diﬀerences in personal and corporate income taxation on entrepreneurial
risk taking. Fuest et al. (2002) show that the presence of a substantial positive tax
gap between the personal income tax and the corporation tax is a second-best solu-
tion to the problem of asymmetric information faced by new ﬁrms. Keuschnigg and
Nielsen (2002, 2004) focus on the eﬀects of various tax policies when entrepreneurs
face ﬁnancial constraints and set up a contract with a venture capitalist under condi-
tions of one-sided or two-sided moral hazard. Finally, Egger et al. (2009) analyze the
incorporation decision of entrepreneurs and provide empirical evidence that a positive
tax gap between personal and corporate tax rates favors incorporation. None of these
contributions, however, incorporates a choice between diﬀerent R&D projects to be
undertaken, nor the option for the entrepreneur to sell her invention to an incumbent
ﬁrm.
Secondly, this paper is also related to the literature on R&D and market structure,
which mainly focuses on the choice of the level of R&D eﬀorts.8 Several papers study
the type of R&D project undertaken by ﬁrms and entrepreneurs (e.g. Bhattacharya
and Mookherjee, 1986). There is also a literature on entrepreneurship and innovations,
which is summarized in Acs and Audretsch (2005), and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005).
To our knowledge, the only analysis considering how the entry mode aﬀects the type
of R&D is Färnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2010). However, this paper focuses on the
interaction between entrepreneurial and incumbent innovations and abstracts from tax
policies, which are central to the present study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our benchmark
model, where the innovation reduces only ﬁxed costs. In Section 3, we solve the diﬀerent
stages of the model and determine the equilibrium allocation in diﬀerent tax regimes.
Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of tax policy on the R&D project choice of the entrepre-
neur and on her commercialization mode. Section 5 analyzes a model extension where
the innovation reduces variable costs of production. Section 6 discusses several other
model extensions, including the role of venture capital ﬁnancing. Section 7 concludes.
8For overviews, see Reinganum (1989) and Gilbert (2006) and for speciﬁc models, see Rosen (1991)
and Cabral (2003).
52T h e f r a m e w o r k
We consider an imperfectly competitive market with  identical incumbent ﬁrms. En-
try costs deter further ﬁrms from entering the market, unless they have a superior
technology. The focus of our analysis lies on the decisions of an independent innovator,
or entrepreneur, who chooses a project with certain risk characteristics and decides
whether to sell the invention or try to enter the market herself. To focus on entrepre-
neurs as providers of breakthrough inventions, we assume that the incumbent ﬁrms do
not innovate.9 The sequence of events in our benchmark model is shown in Figure 1.
********* Figure 1 about here **********
In Stage 1, the entrepreneur makes a ﬁxed monetary investment  in risky R&D, in or-
der to develop an invention. We suppose there to be an inﬁnite number of independent
research projects that the entrepreneur may undertake, all requiring the same invest-
ment costs . Hence, investment projects do not vary by the size of the investment,
but by the riskiness of the chosen project. Each project (say project ) is character-
ized by a certain success probability . Along the technological frontier, entrepreneurs
face a choice between projects that have a high success probability  but deliver a
small reduction in ﬁxed costs in case of success, and projects that are more risky but
also have a larger payoﬀ, if successful. Importantly, we assume that the entrepreneur
is risk-neutral and thus chooses the project which maximizes the expected net payoﬀ
from the investment.10
Our benchmark model assumes that a successful invention reduces only the ﬁxed costs
of production. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the exposition as it implies that
product market competition between all ﬁrms remains symmetric and that the product
market price does not depend on the chosen project.11 To give an example, the ﬁxed cost
of producing a prototype part for a new airplane or a racing car can be reduced by small,
9See Gromb and Scharfstein (2002) and Färnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2010) for models where
innovation takes place both in start-ups and in established ﬁrms.
10Hence, we eliminate the well-known eﬀect that taxes may stimulate entrepreneurial risk-taking
by making the government a silent partner in the (risky) operation (Domar and Musgrave, 1944).
However, this eﬀect is fully eﬀective only when losses are tax-deductible. Since our analysis explicitly
focuses on the limitations of loss oﬀset provisions, the Domar-Musgrave eﬀect is of lesser importance.
11Section 5 considers the more general case where the invention reduces variable production costs.
6low-risk improvements in existing technologies. A high-risk, high-return alternative is
instead to develop a 3D printer which ‘prints’ the prototype part using titanium powder,
causing virtually no waste of this precious material in the process.12
With projects diﬀering by their degree of innovation, ﬁxed production costs are
()= − Γ() (1)
where Γ0
()  0,  ∈ (01). Omitting the project index, the expected payoﬀ Γ() is
assumed to be strictly concave in . Figure 2 illustrates the payoﬀso fd i ﬀerent projects
in terms of expected ﬁxed costs reductions.
********* Figure 2 about here **********
As Figure 2 shows, there is a unique project with success probability 0  ˆ 1 that
maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the invention (or minimizes the expected ﬁxed costs
with the invention), given from the ﬁrst-order condition
Γ(ˆ )+ˆ Γ
0(ˆ )=0  (2)
In the following, we will refer to an R&D project with a risk level of ˆ  as the ‘cost-
eﬃcient’ project. It is instructive to compare the project type chosen by the entrepre-
neur in equilibrium with this cost-eﬃcient project. More formally, we introduce
Deﬁnition 1: The cost-eﬃcient project is given by ˆ  =a r gm a x  Γ()
In Stage 2, after investment  has been made and R&D project  has been chosen, the
entrepreneur can either sell her invention to one of the incumbents or decide to market
the invention herself. If the entrepreneur decides to sell her project, the acquiring
incumbent will replace his initial technology with the innovative one. In this case, there
will thus still be  ﬁrms in the market, though one ﬁrm (the acquirer of the innovation)
may have a superior technology. In the case where the entrepreneur decides to enter
the market, there will be ( +1 )ﬁrms in the market, once more with one ﬁrm (the
entrepreneur herself) having a possibly superior technology, in the sense of facing lower
ﬁxed production costs.
The entrepreneur’s decision of whether to enter the market or sell the innovation to
one of the incumbent ﬁr m si sa ﬀected by tax considerations. We denote by  the
12S e et h ea r t i c l e“ T h ep r i n t e dw o r l d ”i nThe Economist, 10 February 2011.
7eﬀective tax rate, net of subsidies received, faced by the entrepreneur when she decides
to enter the market, whereas  g i v e st h et a xr a t et h a ti sa p p l i c a b l eo nt h ei n c o m es h e
receives when selling the project to an incumbent ﬁrm. For the reasons given in the
introduction, our main analysis is based on a policy setting where  ≤  and there is
a tax/subsidy advantage from market entry.13
Most importantly, the tax advantage from market entry lies in the additional subsi-
dies received in the marketing stage, which are granted only when the entrepreneur
enters the market herself. Moreover, the tax treatment of entrepreneurs is also likely
to diﬀer depending on their mode of commercializing the innovation. We assume that
entrepreneurs producing for market entry will incorporate their business and are thus
subject to the corporate income tax.14 In contrast, entrepreneur producing for sale will
remain unincorporated and are thus subject to personal income taxation. In general,
it is diﬃcult to compare the taxation of incorporated and unincorporated businesses,
as this comparison depends not only on corporate and personal income tax schedules
but also on a number of other country-speciﬁc characteristics. In Europe, however,
corporate tax rates have fallen particularly strongly over the last decades, probably as
a result of intense tax competition (see Devereux et al., 2008). Moreover, all European
countries operate some form of double taxation relief under the corporate income tax
and several countries have special, reduced corporate tax rates for small businesses. In
this region, therefore, it is likely that the market entry of entrepreneurs is tax-favored
over the alternative of project sale, even though - in some countries - reduced capital
gains taxes are applicable for the latter.15
13In Section 6.3 we analyze an alternative setting where tax rates under both commercialization
modes are identical, but the sale to an incumbent is subject to transaction costs.
14According to de Mooij and Nicodème (2008, Table 1), roughly 35% of all businesses in the Euro-
pean Union were incorporated during the period 1998-2003, with wide divergences across countries.
Interestingly, however, the average share of incorporation was slightly higher among new ﬁrms than
among established ﬁrms (36.8% vs. 35.7%), despite the fact that established ﬁrms are, on average,
much larger. Moreover, selection eﬀects can be clearly observed in the data. In Sweden, for example,
only 25% of all ﬁrms which started up in 2005 and were still active in 2008 were incorporated (of a
total of 29 795 start-ups). Among the incorporated start-ups, however, about 72% were high-growth
ﬁrms, as compared to 34% high-growth ﬁrms in other groups. This indicates that successful innovators
are substantially more likely to use incorporation (see Tillväxtanalys, 2010).
15See de Mooij and Nicodème (2008, Table 4), who calculate that the average corporate income tax
rate for small businesses in a sample of 20 European countries was 24% in 2003, as compared to an
average of the top personal income tax rate of almost 43%. The authors provide evidence that this tax
8In Stage 3, the uncertainty is revealed and it turns out whether the innovation is
successful or not. If the entrepreneur has not sold her invention, she is free to enter
t h em a r k e ta tt h i ss t a g e .H o w e v e r ,d u et oe n t r yc o s t sa n dﬁxed costs of production,
entering the market will only be proﬁtable when the innovation is successful (i.e. ﬁxed
production costs are low). If the project fails, the entrepreneur will not enter the market
and she will lose all investment costs.
In Stage 4, oligopolistic product market competition occurs between either  or (+1)
ﬁrms, depending on the commercialization decision of the entrepreneur in Stage 2 and
(in case of market entry) on the success of the project in Stage 3. Equilibrium proﬁts
are paid out and taxes are collected on all income.
3 Equilibrium project choice and mode of commer-
cialization
3.1 Stage 4: Product market interaction
We solve the model by backward induction and start with the interaction of ﬁrms
in the product market. Let the set of ﬁrms in the industry be J =  ∪ I,w h e r e
I ={1 2} is the set of identical incumbent ﬁrms and  is the entrepreneur. The
owner of the invention is denoted by  ∈ J. In the product market interaction, ﬁrm
 chooses an action  ∈ + to maximize its product market proﬁtn e to fﬁxed costs,
(x−) − . This depends on its own and its rivals’ market actions,  and
x−, the identity of the owner of the invention, ,a n dt h eﬁxed cost  to serve the
market. If ﬁrm  owns the invention, and if the project is successful, its ﬁxed cost is
() All other ﬁrms have ﬁx e dp r o d u c t i o nc o s t s.T h i si sa l s ot h eﬁxed cost of the
ﬁrm possessing the invention, in case the invention has failed.
We consider ﬁrm ’s action  as setting either a quantity or a price. We assume that
a unique Nash equilibrium x∗ ()={∗
() ∗







−) ≥ (1 − 
)(
∗
−) ∀ ∈ 
+ (3)
wedge plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining the rising share of incorporated ﬁrms in many European
countries and the accompanying shift in tax revenue from the personal to the corporate income tax.
9where  is the tax rate on each ﬁrm’s proﬁts, which may diﬀer for incumbents ( = )
and for the entrepreneur ( = ). We assume product market proﬁts to be positive.
From (3), we can deﬁne a reduced-form product market proﬁt (before deduction of
ﬁxed costs) for a ﬁrm , taking as given ownership :





Since incumbents 1 2 are symmetric before the acquisition takes place, we need
only distinguish between two types of ownership of the invention: entrepreneurial own-
ership ( = )a n dincumbent ownership ( = ). Moreover, since the innovation
aﬀects only ﬁxed production costs, the product market proﬁtb e f o r ed e d u c t i o no fﬁxed
c o s t sa n dt a x e si sa l w a y st h es a m ef o ra l la c t i v eﬁrms in our benchmark model. Hence,
there are only two possible levels of such proﬁts:  () is the proﬁt of each incumbent
when the entrepreneur does not enter the market, whereas () is the product market
proﬁt of incumbents and the entrepreneur in case of entry.
We assume that market entry by the entrepreneur will reduce the proﬁt of each producer
due to stronger competition, i.e ()  () This assumption is met in standard
models of imperfect competition, such as the oligopoly model of quantity competition
in a homogeneous good, or the model of price competition with diﬀerentiated products.
For later use in our welfare analysis (Section 4.2), let us also make the assumption
that labor is a primary input in the production of ﬁrm 0 product and in its ﬁxed
cost. Normalizing the wage to unity and noting symmetry, it will then be useful to
deﬁne the reduced-form employment in production as () ≡ ((x∗()),w h e r e
(x∗()) is the level of output in ﬁrm . If we assume Cournot competition, then
∗
()=∗
() and () ≡ (∗
()) + . Under Bertrand competition ∗
()=
∗
 () and ∗
(P∗()),w h e r eP∗() is the vector of prices in the Nash-equilibrium.
The reduced-form labor demand is then () ≡ (∗
(P∗())) + .
3.2 Stage 3: Uncertainty revealed
At this stage, it is revealed whether the innovation turns out to be successful or not,
where ‘success’ can either be interpreted in a technological or in a commercial sense.
For example, this stage may describe the results of mechanical or medical tests, which
determine whether a new, cost-saving technology is feasible. For other innovations,
10it may be revealed at this stage whether a small-scale market test shows a suﬃcient
acceptance among prospective buyers to make the introduction of the new technology
commercially viable.
If the innovation is successful, the superiority of the new product over the existing ones
is reﬂected in reduced ﬁxed costs of ()  ¯  from (1). Under failure, the invention
does not reduce the ﬁxed costs for the owner and ﬁxed production costs remain at ¯ .
If the owner of the invention is an incumbent ﬁrm at this stage, then the success or
failure of the innovation has no consequences other than aﬀecting the proﬁts of the
acquiring ﬁrm. In contrast, if the entrepreneur decided in the previous stage not to
sell the invention, the success or failure of the project will aﬀect her decision to enter
t h em a r k e ta tt h i ss t a g e .W ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ea r ee n t r yc o s t s to the imperfectly
competitive market, which are suﬃciently high to render market entry unproﬁtable in
case of project failure. To simplify the algebra, it proves convenient to assume that the
proﬁts from market entry without an improved technology are just equal to zero, and
market entry occurs only when proﬁts are strictly positive.16 This is formalized in:
Assumption A1: When the innovation fails, net proﬁts from entry are zero, () −
¯ − =0 , and the entrepreneur does not enter. When the innovation is successful,
the entrepreneur receives positive net proﬁts equal to () − [ ¯  − Γ()] −  =
Γ()  0 and enters the market.
Assumption A1 implies that there will be (+1) ﬁrms in the ﬁnal stage of the game only
if the entrepreneur does not sell the invention in Stage 2, and if the project is successful.
The ﬁrst part in Assumption A1 also ensures that the initial market structure is stable,
since no competitor can proﬁtably enter the market given the existing technology with
ﬁxed costs ¯  and entry cost .
In the case of project failure, the entrepreneur’s initial investment costs  are lost
entirely. To protect the income tax base and prevent fraud, existing tax codes allow
the deductibility of expenses only in combination with positive income, but do not pay
out negative taxes to the taxable entity in case of a loss.17 Moreover, in the case of
16In essence, this is a free entry condition that will be approximated when the number of incumbents
is not too low. It implies that there is no ‘entry hurdle’ that would reduce the value of the innovation
(Γ) for the entrepreneur in case of market entry.
17Our static model abstracts from the possibility that the entrepreneur can carry forward the loss
11project failure it is also not possible for the entrepreneur to sell her unused tax credit
to one of the incumbents. The reason is that in this case the tax authorities will not
accept a link between an incumbent’s positive income from existing assets and the
losses incurred by the R&D project.
Note, ﬁnally, that our sequence of events implies that the entrepreneur cannot sell her
ﬁrm after the uncertainty has been lifted. In Section 6.2 we will relax this assumption
and show that if a sale has not already occurred in Stage 2, there will also be no post-
uncertainty sale in Stage 3, no matter whether the project turns out to be successful
or not.
3.3 Stage 2: Commercialization
In Stage 2, there is an entry-acquisition game where the entrepreneur can decide
whether to sell the invention to one of the incumbents or enter the market at the
ﬁxed cost , knowing that this is proﬁtable only when the project is successful. The
commercialization process is depicted as an auction where  incumbents simultane-
ously post bids and the entrepreneur then either accepts or rejects these bids. If the
entrepreneur rejects all bids, she will try to enter the market herself. Each incumbent
announces a bid, , for the invention and b =( 1 ) ∈  is the vector of these
bids. Following the announcement of b, the invention may be sold to one of the incum-
bents at the bid price, or remain in the ownership of entrepreneur . If more than one
bid is accepted, the bidder with the highest bid obtains the invention. If there is more
than one incumbent with such a bid, each such incumbent obtains the invention with
equal probability. The acquisition game is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated
pure strategies. There is a smallest amount, , chosen such that all inequalities are
preserved if  is added or subtracted. To solve the commercialization game, it will be
useful to deﬁne ∆() as the net gain for the entrepreneur of selling the invention at a
sales price , over the alternative of market entry.
As discussed in Section 2, the entrepreneur faces the eﬀective tax rate  in case of
market entry. We assume that this tax is levied at a proportional rate. Investment
costs can be deducted from the tax base when there is positive income, but tax credits
for a certain number of years. Empirical evidence suggests that failed start-ups are rarely able to use
loss carry forward provisions in subsequent years. See Auerbach and Altshuler (1990) and Auerbach
(2006) for empirical evidence documenting the importance of unused tax credits among U.S. ﬁrms.
12are not paid out when the project fails and the entrepreneur’s income is thus negative.
If the entrepreneur produces for sale, she will be taxed at the tax rate  on her capital
gains, which are deﬁned as the excess of the sales price over the investment costs. In
this case the acquiring incumbent can always deduct the sales price from its positive
operating proﬁt, irrespective of whether the invention is successful or not. With these
speciﬁcations and using Assumption A1, the entrepreneur’s net gain from selling the
invention at price  over the alternative of market entry is
∆()= −  ( − )
| {z }
Net proﬁtf r o ms a l e
− [ Γ() − 
[Γ() − ]
| {z }
Net expected proﬁt from entry
] (5)
From (5), let the reservation price of the entrepreneur be  =m i n,  ∆() ≥ 0.
That is,  is the minimum price  at which the entrepreneur is willing to sell. Solving











The reservation price  in (6) gives the entrepreneur’s product market proﬁts, net of
the eﬀective corporate taxes  that she must pay under market entry, but grossed up
by the personal income tax  that is due under sale.
Next, we turn to the incumbent ﬁrms’ valuations of the invention. When an incumbent
acquires the invention, it is certain that there will only be  ﬁrms in the market in
the ﬁnal stage and hence its reduced product market proﬁti sa l w a y sg i v e nb y().
When not acquiring the entrepreneurial ﬁrm, the invention can either remain in the
hands of the entrepreneur ( = ) or it can be acquired by a rival incumbent ﬁrm
( = ). This diﬀerence will aﬀect the proﬁts of the non-acquiring incumbent if the
invention is successful, because only in this case will the entrepreneur decide to enter
the market. When the invention fails, the proﬁt of each incumbent will always be ()
in the product market stage, irrespective of the ownership of the invention. The proﬁts
of incumbent ﬁrms are taxed at the rate .18 Finally, as discussed above, the sales
price  is always tax-deductible for the acquiring ﬁrm.19 Denoting the net gain for
18The tax rate  will typically exceed the tax rate  faced by the entrepreneur under market entry,
because incumbents are not eligible for reduced tax rates or support schemes tied to small businesses.
19Our static model assumes that the full sales price  is immediately tax-deductible for the acquiring
ﬁrm. In actual tax law, the sales price is treated like an investment that can only be deducted pro-rata
over several years. Hence, in a dynamic model the present value of being able to deduct  would be
somewhat lower for the acquiring ﬁrm, but this would not qualitatively alter our results.
13an incumbent ﬁrm of acquiring the entrepreneur’s invention at a certain price  by


















Net expected value from a successful innovation




⎣() −  − 
| {z }











Net expected value from an unsuccessful innovation
=( 1− 
){− + Γ()+[() − ()]} (7)
where we have expanded the right-hand side of (7) with () to arrive at the ﬁnal
expression for ∆().
From (7), we can deﬁne an incumbent ﬁrm’s valuation as  ≡ max  ∆() ≥ 0.
Solving for ∆()=0gives  = Γ()+[() − ()] as the maximum price 
a tw h i c ha ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm is willing to buy the entrepreneur’s invention. Incumbent
ﬁrms thus have two valuations: The ﬁrst is a takeover valuation, which is an incumbent
ﬁrm’s value of acquiring the invention when this would otherwise remain in the hands
of the entrepreneur. In this case  =  and
()=Γ()+[() − ()] (8)
where Γ() is the expected ﬁx e dc o s t ss a v i n g so ft h ei n v e n t i o na n d[()−()]  0
is the expected increase in product market proﬁts when the entrepreneur is prevented
from entering the market.
The second valuation is a competitive valuation, which is an incumbent ﬁrm’s value of
acquiring the invention when a rival incumbent ﬁrm would otherwise obtain it. Then
 =  and
()=Γ() (9)
Since the invention only aﬀects ﬁx e dp r o d u c t i o nc o s t s ,t h ep r e e m p t i v ev a l u ei si nt h i s
case simply the expected ﬁxed costs savings of the invention. Comparing (8) and (9),
it is obvious that    since ()  (). This describes the concentration eﬀect
of an acquisition when entry by the entrepreneur is prevented. Finally, note that the
14incumbent ﬁrms’ valuations are unaﬀected by their proﬁtt a xr a t e, because compet-
itive bidding ensures that the equilibrium sales price will equal the expected increase
in proﬁts from acquiring the invention.
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). Since
incumbents are symmetric and    always holds, there are three diﬀerent regimes
that we need to consider. These are summarized in Table 1. The following lemma can
then be stated:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium ownership of the invention ∗ and the acquisition price ∗
are described in Table 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Table 1: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price
Regime Deﬁnition Ownership Acquisition price
1: ()  ()  () m∗ = e —
2: ()  ()  () m∗ = i ∗ = ()
3: ()  ()  () m∗ = i ∗ = ()
Table 1 describes the equilibrium mode of commercialization as a function of the R&D
project chosen by the entrepreneur in the ﬁrst stage, characterized by its success prob-
ability . In Regime 1 (R1 for short), the expected proﬁtf r o me n t e r i n gt h em a r k e t
is higher for the entrepreneur than selling the invention to one of the incumbents. In
Regime 2 the entrepreneur will sell her invention, but the sales price will be determined
by the reservation price  of the entrepreneur. This is because if one incumbent ﬁrm
bids the reservation price, all other incumbents will only be willing to bid the com-
petitive valuation, which is below  in this regime. Hence, the equilibrium bid equals
the reservation price of the entrepreneur. In Regime 3, the invention is also sold in
equilibrium, but the price equals the competitive valuation . Since all incumbents
are simultaneously willing to bid this price, it is also the equilibrium sales price in
R e g i m e3 ,w h e r eo n eo ft h ei n c u m b e n t si sd r a w na st h ea c q u i r e r .
Note that the gains from an entry deterring acquisition in Regime 2 are unevenly dis-
tributed among incumbents, as the acquiring incumbent bears the cost of the entry de-
15terrence while the other ﬁrms can free-ride on the acquisition. This raises the possibility
of coordination failures among incumbents, if ()  ()  (). If a coordination
failure occurs, the entrepreneur may enter the market even though ()  ().T h i s
can be shown by extending the acquisition auction to allow for mixed strategy equilib-
ria. In a mixed strategy equilibrium incumbents can bid () with some probability.
There are then two possible outcomes. In the ﬁrst, at least one incumbent bids ()
and an entry deterring acquisition takes place. In the second, no incumbent bids for
the project and the entrepreneur enters the market.
3.4 Stage 1: Project choice by the entrepreneur
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium project selected by the entrepreneur, given
that she anticipates the mode of commercialization in the second stage of the game.
Since the rewards diﬀer across regimes, the equilibrium project chosen by the entre-
preneur has to be determined independently for each regime. Noting that investment
costs  are independent of project choice, the entrepreneur simply chooses the project
that maximizes the net reward in each regime. From Lemma 1 the net reward for the






(1 − )Γ − (1 − ) ≡ (1 − )[() − ] in R1
(1 − )[() − ] in R2
(1 − )[() − ] in R3
(10)
Note that in Regime 1 the net reward is the entrepreneur’s net expected proﬁtf r o m
entry [see eq. (5)] less the investment costs . By the construction of the reservation
price  in (6), this is equal to the net reward in the (hypothetical) situation where the
entrepreneur receives a sales price  and pays personal income taxes on the excess of
this sales price over the investment costs . This is also how the net reward is calculated
in Regimes 2 and 3, where the sale actually takes place.
To derive the equilibrium project choices we start with Regime 3, where the entrepre-
neur sells her invention at price ∗ = (). In this regime, the net reward is maximized
by incorporating the corporate tax treatment of the incumbent ﬁrms.F r o me q .( 1 0 ) ,t h e
entrepreneur will choose the project ∗
 =a r gm a x (1−)(()−)=a r gm a x  (),










16Since incumbents can fully deduct the investment costs from their taxable proﬁts,
the corporation tax is a lump-sum instrument in this regime. From the perspective of
the entrepreneur, the sales price is therefore maximized by choosing the project that
maximizes the expected ﬁxed cost reduction, as given by ˆ  in equation (2).
Next, we consider the optimal project choice in Regimes 1 and 2. In Regime 1 the
entrepreneur enters the market herself, whereas in Regime 2 she sells the invention,
but the sales price is determined by her reservation price  (the expected proﬁts in
case of entry). In both regimes, the net reward Ω∗ =( 1 −)[()−] is thus maximized
by incorporating the loss oﬀset provisions that apply to the entrepreneur.T h eo p t i m a l
project is given from ∗
 =a r g m a x (1 − )[() − ]=a r g m a x  (),w h e r et h e












The negative term on the right-hand side of (12) shows that in Regimes 1 and 2, the
entrepreneur will not choose the cost-eﬃcient project ˆ  deﬁn e di n( 2 ) .T h ed i s t o r t i o n
arises because the entrepreneur cannot deduct her investment costs from tax in the
case of project failure. This will induce her to choose a project with an ineﬃciently low
level of risk. This eﬀect is the stronger, the higher is the eﬀective tax rate  faced by
the entrepreneur in case of market entry.
4T h e e ﬀects of tax policy
4.1 Eﬀects on project choice and commercialization mode
In this section, we analyze how the system of taxing and subsidizing entrepreneurial
incomes aﬀects the mode of commercialization and the project choice by the entrepre-
neur. We focus on exogenous variations in the eﬀective rate of corporate proﬁtt a x a t i o n
that the entrepreneur faces in case of market entry. To simplify the notation, we drop
the superscript  for this tax rate from here on, so that  ≡ . In this analysis, we hold
constant the personal income tax rate , which is levied in the case of project sale. To
ensure that all possible regimes derived in the preceding section can occur, we assume
that market entry must be the entrepreneur’s preferred mode of commercialization
when  =0 .E ﬀectively, this requires that  must not be too low, relative to the entry
costs .T h i si sf o r m a l l ys t a t e di n :
17Assumption A2: When  =0 , the entrepreneur’s reservation value exceeds the in-
cumbents’ takeover valuation, i.e. (∗
)|=0  (∗
)|=0.
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur faced the same tax rate under the two modes
of commercialization, she would always choose to sell her invention to an incumbent
ﬁrm. This is seen from setting  =  in (6), yielding
()|= = Γ −
(1 − )
(1 − )
  = Γ ∀ ∈ [01] (13)
In this case, the reservation value of market entry for the entrepreneur falls short of
the competitive valuation by incumbents. This implies that, in equilibrium, the entre-
preneur sells her invention at the price . By selling the invention, the entrepreneur
saves the additional expected tax payments that result from the inability to deduct
the investment costs in case of project failure. Since selling the invention yields at least
the expected payoﬀ of the invention in the competitive bidding auction modeled here,
there are no oﬀsetting beneﬁts from market entry when tax rates are equal under the
two alternative modes of commercialization.
In the following, we therefore consider eﬀective corporate tax rates  (net of government
subsidies) for the entrepreneur, which range from zero to the personal income tax rate
. From our discussion in Section 2, raising  towards  is equivalent to a policy that
reduces tax concessions and speciﬁc subsidies exclusively granted to small ﬁrms. To
proceed, we introduce two critical corporate tax rates  and , where the valuation
of the project by the entrepreneur equals the entry deterring (or takeover) valuation
and the competitive valuation by the incumbents, respectively.
Deﬁnition 2: Let  be deﬁned from (∗
)|= = (∗




The following proposition describes how the commercialization mode depends on the
tax rate.
Proposition 1 Assume that  and  exist. Then: (i) commercialization by entry
(Regime 1) occurs, if the eﬀective rate of proﬁt taxation is low,  ∈ [0 ); (ii) com-
mercialization by sale occurs at the sales price ∗ =  (Regime 2), if the proﬁtt a xr a t e
is in the intermediate range  ∈ [ ); (iii) commercialization by sale occurs at the
sales price ∗ =  (Regime 3), if the proﬁt tax rate is suﬃciently high,  ∈ [1].
18Proposition 1, in turn, leads to a proposition describing how project choice depends on
the tax rate.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Proposition 1 holds. Then: (i) for low proﬁtt a xr a t e s
 , the entrepreneur chooses a project with a higher success probability than the
cost-eﬃcient one,  = ∗
  ˆ ; (ii) for suﬃciently high proﬁtt a xr a t e s ≥ ,t h e
entrepreneur’s project choice is eﬃcient,  = ∗
 =ˆ .
Project choice and taxes. Let us ﬁrst prove Proposition 2. Consider the eﬀects of
a change in  on project choice, taking as given how taxes aﬀect the commercialization









Γ00)(1 − )2  0 in R1, R2
0 in R3
(14)
where 2Γ0 + ∗
Γ00  0 follows from the assumption that Γ() is strictly concave.
********* Figure 3 about here **********
The upper panel of Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the eﬀective corporate
tax rate  and the equilibrium project choice, as characterized by the success probability
. From Proposition 1 (and thus anticipating the proof below), Regime 1 arises for
low eﬀective corporate tax rates  , Regime 2 arises for intermediate tax rates
  , and Regime 3 arises for high tax rates  . To interpret panel (i)
of Figure 3, note that the negative eﬀect on the RHS of (12) is absent for  =0and
the chosen project is therefore cost-eﬃcient. As  is increased, the success probability
of the equilibrium project continuously rises throughout Regimes 1 and 2 [cf. eq. (14)],
because the rise in  makes the deductibility of the initial investment outlays more
valuable, and this deductibility can only be used when the project is successful.
In Regime 3, the entrepreneur sells the invention at price ∗ =  and the optimal
project choice is independent of the eﬀective proﬁtt a xr a t e ,∗
 =0 . Overall,
therefore, the equilibrium level of  adjusts in a non-monotonous way to the proﬁtt a x
rate , rising continuously throughout Regimes 1 and 2 and then dropping back to the
eﬃcient level ∗
 =ˆ  at the switch to Regime 3.
19Commercialization mode and taxes. Let us now prove Proposition 1. Panel (iii)
of Figure 3 depicts the valuations (), () and () as functions of the










To see how the diﬀerent valuations depend on the proﬁt tax rate, we need to determine












 | {z }
indirect eﬀect
∀  ∈ {} (16)
We start by evaluating eq. (16) for the entrepreneur’s reservation price ,a sg i v e n
in (6). In Regimes 1 and 2, which arise for  , the indirect eﬀe c ti n( 1 6 )i sz e r o
due to the envelope theorem,  =0 . In Regime 3, which occurs for   the
indirect eﬀect is also zero because  =0from eqs. (15) and (11). Hence, within











w h e r et h et e r mi nt h es q u a r e db r a c k e ti sp o s i t i v es i n c et h ee n t r e p r e n e u rm u s te a r na
positive net reward on her investment when the project is successful. It follows that
within each regime the entrepreneur’s reservation price () is monotonously falling
in the proﬁtt a xr a t e. This can be seen in panel (iii) of Figure 3.20
Let us now turn to the valuations of incumbents, . The direct eﬀect of  on both 
and  is zero from (8) and (9), so we must have  =0in eq. (16). Then, note
that the indirect eﬀect in eq. (16) consists of the induced changes in project choice, as
given in (14), and the incumbents’ valuation of these changes, .21 The latter
are relevant only in Regimes 1 and 2 and are given by


= Γ + 
∗
Γ
0 + () − ()






20Note that the envelope theorem can only be used in Regimes 1 and 2, where the optimal project
chosen by the entrepreneur is based on the maximization of . Hence, if the project choice changes
discretely at the tax rate ,t h ev a l u eo f may exhibit a jump at this point.
21The envelope theorem can not be applied to determine the eﬀect of  on the incumbents’ valuations,
because the project is not chosen to maximize  or  in Regimes 1 and 2.
20For  , increases in the tax rate  (and thus in )h a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect on 
and an ambiguous eﬀect on .A tt h es w i t c ht oR e g i m e3a t = , there is a jump
in the valuation of incumbents due to the discrete change in optimal project choice
from eq. (15). Thus, as shown by panel (iii) of Figure 3, the competitive valuation
() is decreasing in  until the switch to Regime 3 at  = ,w h e r e jumps up
to (∗
)  (∗
). The takeover valuation () has a similar overall pattern and
will also exhibit a jump at  = .
The equilibrium commercialization pattern is shown by panel (ii) of Figure 3. When
the corporate tax rate is low,  ∈ (0 ), the entry value  exceeds the incumbents’
takeover valuation . This leads to an equilibrium in Regime 1 with the entrepreneur
retaining the ownership of her invention and entering the market in case the invention
succeeds. As the proﬁt tax rate increases, it reaches the ﬁrst critical value, denoted
, where the entrepreneur’s reservation value equals the takeover valuation of the
incumbents. At  =  the equilibrium switches to Regime 2 with an entry deterring
acquisition taking place at the acquisition price ∗ = . Other incumbents will not
preempt a rival’s acquisition in the range  ∈ [ ), since the net value of preemption
is negative,  −   0.A s rises further, it reaches the second critical level, denoted
 = , where the entrepreneur’s reservation value falls to the competitive valuation of
the incumbent ﬁrms. This induces a bidding war between incumbents and results in
Regime 3 where the sales price of the invention is ﬁxed by the competitive valuation
of the incumbents. Further increases in  continue to reduce the entry value of the
entrepreneur, which falls to zero at  =1 . ¤
To summarize, government policies that reduce the eﬀective proﬁtt a x a t i o no fs m a l l
businesses by granting reduced tax rates and various subsidies encourage market entry
by entrepreneurs and foster competition in the innovative sector. At the same time,
however, the entrepreneur’s choice of project will be distorted whenever she produces
for market entry.22 As shown in panel (i) of Figure 3, when proﬁtt a xr a t e sa r ei n
the range  ∈ [0 ), even risk-neutral entrepreneurs will choose projects that involve
too little risk and fall short of maximizing the expected return from the investment
(∗
  ˆ ). This eﬀect arises from the imperfect loss oﬀset that entrepreneurs face in
case of project failure. We now turn to the welfare implications of this result.
22This is also true when a mixed strategy equilibrium results in Regime 2, as a result of a coordi-
nation failure between incumbents. Recall our discussion at the end of Section 3.3.
214.2 Welfare eﬀects of tax policy
In this section we analyze how taxes impact expected welfare by aﬀecting the R&D
project choice and the commercialization mode of the entrepreneur. To this end we
measure welfare as the sum of aggregate industry proﬁts, consumer surplus and tax
revenue. In Regime 1, where the entrepreneur enters the market, the net reward is
given by (1 − )[Γ()] − (1 − ) in eq. (10). However the expected income loss
for the entrepreneur that arises from the inability to deduct investment cost from tax in
case the project fails is fully compensated by higher expected tax payments, (Γ−).
H e n c et h es u mo ft a xr e v e n u ea n dt h ee n t r e p r eneur’s net reward equals the gross reward
from the innovation, Γ() − .
In Regimes 2 and 3, where the innovation is sold to an incumbent, the personal income
tax  is applied on the tax base ( − ) and ( − ), respectively. Together with
tax revenues, the gross reward is again Γ() −  in Regime 2 and Γ() −  in
Regime 3. This yields the following expressions for expected welfare:
[]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
∗
Γ(∗
) −  + ()+()
+∗
{[() − ()] + () − ()} in R1
∗
Γ(∗
) −  + ()+() in R2
∗
Γ(∗
) −  + ()+() in R3
(19)
In eq. (19), the expected welfare expression in Regime 1 accounts for the fact that
market entry by the entrepreneur increases the number of ﬁrms from  to (+1).T h i s
causes a decline in the incumbents’ aggregate proﬁts given by [() − ()]  0 and
an increase in consumer surplus given by () − ()  0.T h u st h et e r mi nt h e
second line of Regime 1 combines the externalities caused by the market entry of the
entrepreneur. This term is labelled the aggregate business stealing eﬀect by Mankiw
and Whinston (1986) and it can be positive or negative, depending on the underlying
olipopoly model. In a symmetric Cournot model with homogenous goods, the reduction
in producer surplus dominates and the overall externality caused by market entry is
negative. If ﬁrms’ products are diﬀerentiated, however, the increase in consumer surplus
from entry may dominate as consumers also value the addition of a new product.
We can now discuss the overall welfare eﬀects of tax policy. If [() − ()]+()−
()  0 holds in Regime 1, then market entry by the entrepreneur unambiguously
reduces aggregate welfare, relative to the alternative of selling the innovation. Re-
22call that Γ() in Regimes 1 and 2 is below Γ() in Regime 3, because the
entrepreneur’s project choice is distorted in the ﬁrst two regimes, but not in the
third [cf. eqs. (11) and (12)]. Hence a clear welfare ranking arises in this case with
[(1)]  [(2)]  [(3)]. From Proposition 1, the optimal policy in this
case would thus tax the entrepreneur’s proﬁts under market entry at a similar rate as
t h ep r o c e e d sf r o mt h es a l eo ft h ei n n o v a t i o nt oa ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm.
In contrast, when [() − ()] + () − ()  0 then a trade-oﬀ results for
tax policy. There is now an argument to tax-discriminate in favour of entrepreneurial
market entry, as this will beneﬁt consumers due to increased competition, lower prices
and higher output in the innovative market. At the same time, however, market entry
by the entrepreneur will still imply a choice of project that involves too little risk
and therefore does not maximize the expected beneﬁts from the innovation. Thus,
government policy towards small ﬁrms has to make a choice between the goals of
competition policy on the one hand, and the fostering of ‘breakthrough’ inventions on
the other.
S of a rw eh a v ef o l l o w e dt h et y p i c a lw a yo fe v aluating welfare in concentrated indus-
tries, which is built on the assumption that the policy under consideration does not
aﬀect other markets. As we have discussed in the introduction, however, one of the
main objectives of supporting small, entrepreneurial ﬁrms is the belief that they cre-
ate additional jobs. This objective is particularly relevant in countries suﬀering from
ineﬃcient labour markets and high unemployment. It is straightforward to incorporate
this argument into our analysis, using the additional notation for sectoral production
and employment introduced in Section 3.1. Recalling that the employment in ﬁrm  is
denoted by () and using symmetry, the expected sectoral employment under mar-
ket entry is [()] = (+1 )[ ()+] −∗
Γ(∗
). In contrast, expected employment
under an entry-deterring sale in Regime 2 is [()] = ()+∗
Γ(∗
) and under a
competitive sale in Regime 3 it is [()] = ()+ − ∗
Γ(∗
).
To further explore these employment eﬀects, suppose that ﬁrms produce with a con-
stant returns to scale technology with ()=∗
()+,w h e r e() is ﬁrm ’s output.
Recalling that labor is the only input in production, expected employment in the entre-
preneurial ﬁrm under entry is ∗()+ −∗
Γ(∗
)  0 and total sectoral employment
under entry is [()] = (+1)[∗()+]−∗
Γ(∗
). If the project is instead sold to
an incumbent, there is no employment in the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and sectoral employ-
23ment is [()] = [∗()+]−Γ() where  = ∗
 in Regime 2 and  = ∗

in Regime 3. Introducing aggregate output ∗() ≡ ( +1 ) ∗() and ∗() ≡ ∗() it
then follows that:
[()] − [()] = [
∗() − 











The ﬁrst term in this inequality captures that aggregate production rises when an
additional ﬁrm enters the market and the second term results because the additional
ﬁrm also demands additional labor for its ﬁxed operations. Finally, the third term
is zero in comparison to a sale in Regime 2 and positive in comparison to a sale
in Regime 3, mirroring the fact that market entry creates fewer expected savings of
labor used in the ﬁxed operations as compared to a project sale in Regime 3. In sum,
commercialization by entry therefore unambiguously increases employment, relative to
either an entry-deterring or a competitive project sale. This is stated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 When the technology exhibit constant returns to scale and the innova-
tion aﬀects only ﬁxed costs, then commercializing the innovation via the market entry
of the entrepreneur increases total employment in comparison to commercialization by
sale, [()] − [()]  0.
In a setting where the employment eﬀects summarized in Proposition 3 are more im-
portant than the costs of a distorted project choice, there is thus an argument that
policymakers should indeed tax market entry more favorable, or grant speciﬁc subsi-
dies to SMEs. This conclusion, however, hinges on the assumption that the innovation
aﬀects only ﬁxed production costs. In the next section, we will see that results may be
very diﬀerent when the choice of the R&D projects aﬀects variable production costs.
5 Variable cost saving inventions
In this section, we show that if more risky projects are associated with larger reductions
in variable costs (or improvements in quality), consumers may unambiguously prefer
commercialization by sale over commercialization by entry. For this purpose, we brieﬂy
discuss how the analysis in the diﬀerent stages of the game changes when variable cost
reductions are allowed for.
24Stage 4: Consider a situation where the invention reduces the variable cost, while
ﬁxed costs are ignored. Hence the gains from a more risky project in case of success
are now given by larger variable cost savings for the possessor of the invention. Let
the acquiring incumbent’s product market proﬁt for a successful invention be  (),
where  is the project choice in Stage 1. Similarly, let the entrepreneur’s proﬁtw h e n











 0,  ∈ {}
Assumption A.3 (i) states that the product market proﬁt from a successful inven-
tion is smaller for the possessor (either the acquiring incumbent or the entrepreneur
herself) when the riskiness of the project decreases. Assumption A.3 (ii) states that
non-acquiring incumbents see their proﬁts increasing when the possessor has a safer
project, since rivals then face less ﬁerce competition from the owner of the invention.
These assumptions will, for instance, hold for a process innovation where a more risky
innovation leads to a larger reduction in the marginal cost of selling and producing for
the product market.
Stage 3: At this stage, it is again revealed whether the innovation turns out to be
successful. We maintain Assumption A1 so that entry is only proﬁtable if the project
succeeds. Hence  () −  ≥ 0,b u t (0) −  =0 ,w h e r e() is the proﬁt
of the entrepreneur under entry with project  and  (0) is the proﬁt with a failed
project.












The takeover valuation and the competitive valuations of an incumbent deﬁn e di n( 8 )
and (9) become
 = [() − ()]  = [() − ()] (21)
where again    since ()  (). From the latter inequality, it follows
that the equilibrium commercialization mode can be solved by applying Lemma 1.
25Stage 1: Turning to the entrepreneur’s project choice, we assume that () and
[() − ()] are strictly concave in , ensuring well-deﬁned project choices.
Introducing [()] ≡ () as the expected value of the project and using
Assumption A1, the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal project choice when innovating
for entry or selling at the reservation price ∗ =  in Regimes 1 and 2 becomes:
[()]










 .( 2 2 )
As in our benchmark model [see eq. (12)], the inability to deduct the investment costs
from tax in case of failure will induce the investor to choose a project with too little
risk, other things being equal.
When innovating for sale under bidding competition in Regime 3, receiving the sale
























The optimal project choice in Regime 3 is again independent of the eﬀective tax rate.
There is, however, an important diﬀerence to our benchmark case. With variable cost
reductions, an entrepreneur that chooses an optimal project for sale will not only
consider how the expected product market proﬁt of the acquirer is aﬀected, but she
will also take into account that choosing a safer project increases the expected proﬁt
for a non-acquirer (see Assumption A3). Since the incumbents’ willingness to pay for
the project is negatively aﬀected by the proﬁts of a non-acquirer [see eq. (21)], this
gives a strategic incentive to the entrepreneur to choose a more risky project.
This strategic incentive is shown in the lower panel (ii) of Figure 4, where the slope of
the marginal expected proﬁt curve from a change in  is always steeper in Regime 3 as
compared to Regimes 1 and 2. For this reason the diﬀerence in the risk characteristics
o ft h ep r o j e c t sc h o s e ni nR e g i m e1a n d2o nt h eo n eh a n da n dR e g i m e3o nt h eo t h e r
is even larger than in our benchmark case.
********* Figure 4 about here **********
The eﬀects of tax policy on consumers. Let us now examine how eﬀective tax
rates aﬀect consumers through the entrepreneur’s choice of project and the mode of
commercialization. Maintaining Assumption A2, we proceed as in Section 4 and deﬁne
26reduced-form valuations () ≡ (()). Taking the total derivative in eﬀective taxes
 and applying the envelope theorem, it is straightforward to show that Propositions 1
and 2 are also fulﬁlled when more risky projects are associated with larger variable
cost reductions.
Consider now the upper panel (i) of Figure 4. Let  be the consumer surplus when
the invention has failed. The expected consumer surplus under innovation by entry and
under innovation by sale is then [()] ≡ ()+(1−) and [()] ≡
()+(1−), respectively. For the same project , innovation by entry always
gives a higher expected consumer surplus since ()   () from the concen-
tration eﬀect of an acquisition. Assume that the expected consumer surplus is strictly
concave in , so that there exist optimal projects 
 =a r gm a x [()+(1−) ¯ ]
and 
 =a r gm a x [()+( 1− ) ¯ ] from the perspective of consumers. Note
that, because of imperfect competition in the product market, the interests of producers
and consumers are generally not aligned in our model. Regardless of entry mode, the
entrepreneur will therefore not choose a project that maximizes the expected consumer





Suppose that we start from a high eﬀective corporate tax rate for the entrepreneur,
 . From Proposition 1, this implies that the entrepreneur will choose commercial-
ization by sale at the sales price ∗ = . This yields an expected consumer surplus of
[(∗
)],a ss h o w nb yp o i n t in Figure 4 (i). Suppose then that the eﬀective tax
rate is reduced to 1   so that the entrepreneur chooses instead commercialization
by entry. With the new eﬀective tax rate 1 the entrepreneur will choose an overly safe
project under market entry, due to the incomplete loss oﬀset provisions of the corpo-
rate tax code. This project choice, however, yields only limited reductions in variable
costs, and hence consumer prices, in case it succeeds. A comparison of the points 
and 1 in Figure 4 (i) reveals that the expected consumer surplus will be lower under
market entry than under sale, [(∗
1)]  [(∗
)], even though the number
of competitors is higher with market entry by the entrepreneur.
In this case the interests of consumers will be best served when the entrepreneur sells
t h ei n n o v a t i o nt oa ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm in Regime 3 and chooses a project that minimizes
the expected variable costs of production. Moreover, commercialization by sale may also
be preferred from the perspective of maximizing total employment. The reason is that
lower consumer prices are generally associated with higher total output, resulting in
27higher employment if the expansion in output dominates the labor saving eﬀects of new
technologies. The optimal policy would thus be to tax the entrepreneur’s proﬁts under
market entry and the proceeds from the sale of the innovation at roughly equal tax rates,
so as to preserve neutrality for the entrepreneurial decision on how to commercialize
the innovation.
6 Discussion and further extensions
In this section, we discuss our results further by introducing some other extensions or
modiﬁcations of our benchmark model.
6.1 Stage 0: Entrepreneurial choice of eﬀort
An important aspect of entrepreneurial innovation is that a substantial share of the
initial investment may consist of eﬀort put in by the entrepreneur. We incorporate
this aspect by introducing a zero stage of the game where the entrepreneur chooses an
endogenous level of eﬀort, denoted by , in order to generate a basic innovative idea.
We then study how taxes aﬀect this choice variable.
The entrepreneur’s eﬀort level  determines the probability of succeeding with a basic
invention that is necessary for being able to start an R&D project in Stage 1. For
simplicity, assume that the probability of succeeding with a basic invention is simply
the eﬀort, i.e.  ∈ [01],a n dt h a te ﬀort is associated with an increasing and convex
cost (), i.e. 0()  0 and 00()  0.E ﬀorts are not deductible when paying taxes.
Then, let Ω∗() be the reduced-form expected proﬁt given from equation (10). Deﬁne
Π = Ω∗()−() as the expected net proﬁto fab a s i ci n v e n t i o n .T h eo p t i m a le ﬀort







∗)=0 ,( 2 4 )
with the associated second-order condition 2Π2 = −00()  0.
Applying the implicit function theorem in (24), we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium eﬀort by the entrepreneur in stage 0, ∗, and hence the
probability of succeeding with a basic invention, increases in the net reward for the
invention, i.e. ∗Ω∗()  0.
28To determine the eﬀects of taxes on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort level, we start with the
eﬀective corporate tax rate . Note from eq. (10) that the reduced-form net reward
is Ω∗(∗
)=( 1− )[(∗
) − ] for  ∈ [0 ],a n dΩ∗(∗
)=( 1− )[(∗
) − ] for
 . The reservation price is decreasing in corporate taxes from eq. (17), whereas the
competitive valuation of incumbents is independent of corporate taxes from eq. (16).
Thus, it follows that an increase in corporate tax only decreases the incentives to
provide eﬀort when corporate taxes are so low that an equilibrium in Regime 1 or 2
results. In contrast, if corporate taxes are suﬃciently high so that a sale takes place
under bidding competition (Regime 3), the net reward is independent of corporate
taxes. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
********* Figure 5 about here **********
T u r n i n gt ot h ep e r s o n a li n c o m et a x,d i ﬀerentiating the net reward Ω∗(∗
) in (10)
with respect to , using (6) and once more noting that indirect eﬀects through the















) − ]  0 for 
 (26)
Hence, an increase in the personal income tax reduces the net reward for the innovation
in Regime 3, but not in Regimes 1 and 2. Using Lemma 2, we can then summarize our
r e s u l t sa sf o l l o w s :
Proposition 4 I n c r e a s e dc o r p o r a t et a x e s( i nR e g i m e s1a n d2 )a n di n c r e a s e dp e r s o n a l
income taxes (in Regime 3) reduce the eﬀort to create innovative ideas.
Proposition 4 shows that the disincentive eﬀects of a particular tax on entrepreneurial
eﬀort will generally depend on the commercialization mode in our model. This com-
plements existing results in the literature which have emphasized the eﬀort-reducing
eﬀects of capital gains taxes, in particular, but not in a setting with an endogenous
commercialization choice (e.g. Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004).
296.2 Post uncertainty sale and multi-ﬁrm licensing
As illustrated in Figure 1, our benchmark model assumes that the entrepreneur can only
sell the invention in Stage 2. Hence, we have ruled out the option for the entrepreneur
to sell the invention after the uncertainty has been lifted in Stage 3. In this section, we
demonstrate that such post-uncertainty sales will not occur in equilibrium.
If the project is revealed to be a success at the beginning of Stage 3, this informa-
tion is private and cannot be credibly revealed to incumbents. The superiority of the
entrepreneur’s cost structure can only be veriﬁed in Stage 4, when the proﬁts from
product market interaction become public information through accounting laws and
accounting standards. We proceed to show that if an acquisition has not occurred in
Stage 2, there will not be an acquisition post-uncertainty in Stage 3. We assume that
the acquisition auction in Stage 3 is once more a ﬁrst-price perfect information auction
with externalities and solve for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. Using
Assumption A1, the entrepreneur’s net gain from selling the invention at price  over
the alternative of market entry is now
∆()= −  ( − )
| {z }





Net expected proﬁt from entry
} (27)












Comparing (28) and (6) shows that ()  (): the reservation price of the entrepre-
neur has risen because the success probability is one from her point of view. However,
incumbents cannot infer the quality of the project so that their valuations remain at
 and ,a sd e ﬁned in (8) and (9). If no acquisition occurred in Stage 2, this implies
that     . But then, an acquisition in Stage 3 cannot be proﬁtable from
()  .
An issue that also arises in this context is multi-ﬁrm licensing. Multi-ﬁrm licensing
seems not to be an option before uncertainty is revealed, since no “product” can then
be licensed, but it may become a relevant issue post-uncertainty. There are, however,
several reason why multi-ﬁrm licensing might not be an optimal strategy, even in the
case where inventions reduce only ﬁxed costs.
30First, in many cases, the ‘innovation’ consists of a combination of assets in terms of
capital, intellectual capital, and human capital, which cannot be used by many ﬁrms
simultaneously. Multi-ﬁrm licensing is then not an option.23 Second, if the licensee
and the licensor need to undertake post-licensing investments, free riding problems
will likely be increased if there are many licensees. Third, if asymmetric information
is present, the paradox of disclosure (Arrow, 1962) might arise. The willingness-to-pay
of potential buyers depends then on their knowledge of the idea. Disclosure increases
the buyer’s valuation but reduces the inventor’s bargaining power. Potential buyers
can claim that an idea was known, expropriating innovators once they have disclosed
their invention. The disclosure problem can be ameliorated by not licensing to all ﬁrms
in the market. When many partners are potentially available, innovators can credibly
threaten to pursue their idea with a third party when conducting bilateral negotiations
with a particular established ﬁrm. The start-up’s ability to threaten pervasive disclosure
increases its bargaining power and so reduces the degree of expropriation (Anton and
Yao, 1994, 1995).
6.3 Innovation for sale and incorporation
We have assumed that entrepreneurs that innovate for sale never incorporate. In prac-
tice, we observe that some entrepreneurs incorporate before selling their invention.
What would be the eﬀect of allowing entrepreneurs thati n n o v a t ef o rs a l et oi n c o r p o -
rate, in order to face a lower tax rate?
For analytical simplicity, we focus on the extreme case where tax rates are identical
when innovating for market entry or for sale, i.e.  = .24 In order to still have a trade-
oﬀ between market entry and sale in this case, we add a tax-deductible transaction cost
 for incumbents when acquiring. This cost could correspond to, for instance, legal fees
23Indeed, we observe many cases where small, innovative ﬁrms are acquired by a single, large in-
cumbent. An example is Cisco’s acquisition of Cerent in 1999 at the price of $6.9 billion.
24Hence the speciﬁcation here ignores the fact that some government subsidies for SMEs are only
available when entrepreneurs actually enter the market.
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Net expected value from an unsuccessful innovation
=( 1− 
){− −  + Γ()+[() − ()]} (29)
Then, use that an incumbent ﬁrm’s valuation is  ≡ max  ∆() ≥ 0.S o l v i n g
for ∆()=0gives  = Γ()+[() − ()] −  as the maximum price  at
w h i c ha ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm is willing to buy the entrepreneur’s invention. The takeover
valuation and the competition valuation are
()=Γ()+[() − ()] −  ()=Γ() −  (30)
Note that the ﬁxed cost  has no eﬀect on the optimal project choices in eq. (15).
Hence, the entrepreneur’s reservation price is once more given by (6), which simpliﬁes
to




It then directly follows from eqs. (30)—(31) that if transaction costs  become suﬃ-
ciently large, the reservation price of the entrepreneur will be higher than incumbents’
valuations, even if  = . This holds in equilibrium when we incorporate optimal project
choices, which are unaﬀected by transaction costs and given in eq. (15).25 Hence, when
the entrepreneur produces for entry, she will still choose an ineﬃcient project that
b e a r st o ol i t t l er i s k ,a sar e s u l to fi n c o m p l e t el o s so ﬀset provisions.
6.4 Venture capitalists and ﬁnancial partners
Our benchmark analysis has assumed that the entrepreneur is not able to obtain tax
rebates for the investment costs incurred when she attempts to enter the market her-
self, but the project fails. These loss oﬀset restrictions imply that the entrepreneur
25This can be illustrated in panel (iii) of Figure 3, where transaction costs would merely shift down
the locus of the takeover valuation () and the competitive valuation ().
32could gain from the co-operation with partners who have other incomes to deduct the
losses against. Thus, the distortion to the choice of project could be avoided if the
entrepreneur used a noncorporate ﬂow-through entity in Stage 1, where the investment
cost  is incurred. Then the costs could be deducted as long as at least one partner has
suﬃcient positive income. This is likely to be the case, in particular, if the other party
is a ﬁnancial partner.
These types of partnerships are, however, associated with severe adverse selection and
moral hazard problems. Hence ﬁnancial partners, where they exist, almost always in-
volve a highly specialized venture capitalist. Indeed, only few projects are venture
capital backed in most countries. Even in the United States, where the venture cap-
ital market is by far the largest, only 14,000 portfolio companies worldwide received
venture capital over a 30-year period from 1975 to 2005 (Lerner, 2010). Total venture
capital investments in the United States amounted to 28.8 billion US-$ in 2008, cor-
responding to 0.20 percent of this country’s GDP.26 In Europe, the share of venture
capital investments in GDP is much lower, equalling 0.07 percent of national GDP in
Sweden, 0.05 percent in the United Kingdom and 0.03 percent of GDP in Germany
(EFI, 2011, p. 19).
Moreover, even for start-up ﬁrms backed by venture capital (VC), the possibility to
deduct losses for tax purposes is far from complete. On the one hand, entrepreneurs
usually retain a substantial ownership share in the VC-backed company, in order to
mitigate the moral hazard problems inherent in the relationship with the venture cap-
italist (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2002, 2004). This implies, however, that loss oﬀset
restrictions will still apply for the ownership share of the entrepreneur. In addition,
some countries’ tax laws also restrict the tax deduction of losses for venture capitalists.
In Germany, for example, unused tax losses cannot be transferred when the venture
capitalist sells her shares in the company - for example to another VC ﬁrm, which
specializes in ﬁnancing a diﬀerent development phase of the start-up. These restrictive
tax provisions are widely believed to hinder VC ﬁnancing, but also the establishment
and growth of innovative companies in Germany (EFI, 2011, p. 19).
In sum, bringing venture capital ﬁnancing into the picture and accounting for its relative
importance will introduce some qualiﬁcations to our assumption that an entrepreneur
producing for market entry is not able to obtain any tax rebates for losses incurred
26See “Investment funding rose 5 percent in 2008”, VentureBeat, 18 February 2009.
33in the investment phase. However, this extension will clearly not overturn our basic
argument that loss oﬀset restrictions are more severe when the entrepreneur produces
for market entry, as opposed to selling her innovation to an incumbent ﬁrm.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have focused on two important decision margins of entrepreneurs
that have received little analysis so far in a context of public policy. These are the
decision of the entrepreneur to choose between projects with diﬀerent risk and return
characteristics, and her decision of how to commercialize the innovation. Our analysis
has shown that government policies to support small, technology-intensive businesses
by means of various subsidy programs will promote market entry by entrepreneurs
over the alternative of selling out the innovation to incumbent ﬁrms. At the same time,
however, the entrepreneur will choose R&D projects involving suboptimally low levels
of risk and expected return. This points to a basic trade-oﬀ for governments between
a policy that promotes market entry and ﬁrm growth for start-up ﬁrms in technology-
intensive markets, and the goal of fostering ‘breakthrough’ innovations that maximize
expected cost reductions.
Our analysis has also indicated that the welfare implications from this trade-oﬀ may
depend strongly on the precise eﬀects that innovations have on the ﬁrms’ cost structure.
If innovations reduce mostly ﬁxed costs, fostering market entry by SMEs will increase
aggregate employment and consumer surplus and may therefore be an attractive pol-
icy, despite the induced distortion of R&D choices. If, however, innovations have a
substantial eﬀect on the marginal cost of producing output, then distorting the entre-
preneur’s project choice under market entry has far more severe implications. In this
case, it is possible that a subsidy-induced market entry by SMEs reduces both output
and employment, in addition to distorting the choice of the innovation project. In this
case consumers would be unambiguously better oﬀ if the subsidies to SMEs’ market
entry were eliminated and the entrepreneur sold the innovation to an incumbent ﬁrm.
Our results can be contrasted with existing policies to support entrepreneurship in the
European Union and elsewhere. The Small Business Act for Europe (European Com-
mission, 2008, 2011), for example, simultaneously aims at fostering risky innovations
and employment growth through the promotion of SMEs. Our benchmark case, where
34i n n o v a t i o n sr e d u c eo n l yﬁxed costs, has shown that these two policy goals may be
mutually incompatible when the interaction between the entrepreneur’s project choice
and the choice of commercialization mode is explicitly analyzed. Moreover, when in-
novations reduce variable production costs, a policy of supporting market entry by
entrepreneurs may even run counter to both t h ee m p l o y m e n ta n dt h ei n n o v a t i o ng o a l s
set out in the Small Business Act. What would be needed instead in this case is a tax
and subsidy policy that is neutral with respect to the entrepreneur’s choice of retaining
or selling the ﬁrm. Another part of the appropriate policy package would be to improve
the legal framework and reduce the transaction costs for sales to incumbent ﬁrms, so
as to ensure an eﬀective bidding competition for target ﬁrms and their patents.
Our analysis has taken as given that entrepreneurs are unable to claim tax rebates for
the losses incurred in the case of project failure. One might therefore ask whether it is
possible, or even attractive, to fully eliminate the asymmetry in the tax treatment of
proﬁts and losses in existing tax systems. This would imply, however, that tax rebates
must be granted for investment costs, even if there is no oﬀsetting positive income in
any period. Hence the overall tax payments of a ﬁrm over its entire life cycle could
become negative, resulting in a transfer from the tax authorities to the entrepreneur.
It seems obvious that such a tax provision, if introduced, would be highly susceptible
to abuse and fraud, even if it were explicitly conﬁned to enterprises below a well-
deﬁned size threshold. Moreover, a selective policy where full oﬀset provisions only
apply to SMEs would add to the tax privileges that small businesses already enjoy
under current tax rules in many countries, and which have been severely criticized
as distorting competition in the business sector (see Mirrlees et al., 2011). For these
reasons we believe that the second-best framework with imperfect loss oﬀset which
underlies our analysis will remain the relevant setting in which to analyze public policy
towards entrepreneurs.
In addition to its normative implications, our analysis also leads to several hypotheses
that can be tested empirically. As incentive schemes for small businesses have prolif-
erated and corporate tax rates for incorporated start-ups have fallen sharply in many
countries, this has led to a rising tax/subsidy advantage for market entry by entrepre-
neurs over the alternative of project sale. According to our analysis, these developments
should have led to a rising share of innovations that are commercialized by the market
entry of entrepreneurs and at the same time should have induced less risky, and also
less eﬃcient, innovation projects.
35In concluding, we emphasize that our analysis is but a ﬁrst step towards a more com-
prehensive study of the eﬀects of public policies on the market for entrepreneurial inno-
vations. A ﬁrst limitation of our analysis is that we have not been able to derive optimal
policies towards small businesses endogenously, due to the complex decision structure
of our model. A further restriction is that our analysis has been static in nature, even
though a core reason for the support of entrepreneurial innovations is their growth-
promoting eﬀect. Finally, entrepreneurial investment sometimes takes place within a
highly complex framework of contractual arrangements between innovators, banks and
venture capitalists, where incentives for all agents can be distorted. For instance, heavy
reliance on debt ﬁnancing can lead to excessive risk-taking by entrepreneurs, counter-
acting the distortion that arises from limited loss oﬀset opportunities in the present
paper. These extensions seem to be promising areas for future research.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that  ≥ max= {ei} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no
incumbent will post a bid equal toor above its maximum valuation of obtaining the
invention and that ﬁrm  will accept a bid iﬀ   .
Regime 1: Consider equilibrium candidate ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2) where ∗
   ∀ ∈ 
It then directly follows that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Then, note that the entrepreneur will accept a bid iﬀ  ≥  But  ≥  is a weakly
dominated bid in these intervals, since   max{ } Thus, the assets will not be
sold in these intervals.
Regime 2: Consider equilibrium candidate ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2) Then, ∗
   is not
an equilibrium since ﬁrm  would then beneﬁtf r o md e v i a t i n gt o = .F u r t h e r ,
∗
   is not an equilibrium, since the entrepreneur would then not accept any bid. If
∗
 =  − ,t h e nﬁrm  has no incentive to deviate By deviating to 0
 ≤ ∗
, ﬁrm ’s
payoﬀ does not change ( 6= ). By deviating to 0
  ∗
 ﬁrm ’s payoﬀ decreases
since it must pay a price above its willingness to pay .A c c o r d i n g l y ,ﬁrm  has no
incentive to deviate. By deviating to , the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases since it
foregoes a selling price above its valuation . Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no
incentive to deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
36Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. If  ≥ ,t h e nﬁrm  will have the
incentive to deviate to 0 =  −.I f  , the entrepreneur will have the incentive
to deviate to , which contradicts the assumption that  is a Nash equilibrium.
Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say  iﬀ
 ≤ . But incumbent  6=  will have the incentive to deviate to 0 =  + in Stage
1, since   . This contradicts the assumption that  is a Nash equilibrium.
Regime 3: Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2) Then, ∗
 ≥  is a
weakly dominated strategy. Also ∗
   −  is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm  6= 
then beneﬁts from deviating to  = ∗
 +  since it will then obtain the assets and
pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If ∗
 =  − ,a n d∗
 ∈
[ −  − 2], then no incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to ,
the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases, as she foregoes a selling price exceeding her entry
valuation . Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to deviate and thus, ∗ is
a Nash equilibrium.
Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say  iﬀ
 ≤ . But incumbent  6=  will then have the incentive to deviate to 0 =  +  in
Stage 1, since   . This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
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